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What Was accomplished in hong Kong?
Trade  ministers  from  member  countries  of  the  World Trade 
Organization (WTO) convened in Hong Kong in December 
2005 to jump-start the flagging Doha Round of multilat-
eral trade negotiations. The Hong Kong ministerial was not a 
complete bust. But ministers accomplished only the minimum 
necessary to keep the Doha Round moving forward—toward an 
undetermined and probably distant conclusion.
The meeting achieved more in spirit than in substance and 
placed more emphasis on negotiating process than on policy 
reform. Concluding the talks by the targeted deadline of year-
end 2006 is now highly improbable.
Much of the 40-plus-page ministerial declaration confirms 
policies already being pursued by the major trading nations. The 
industrial countries anted up kernels of subsidy reform and devel-
opment assistance, but all of the big-ticket items were studiously 
deferred to future meetings. Progress on nonagricultural market 
access (NAMA) and services was microscopic. Ministers were 
left with little to celebrate, except for a few minor decisions to 
•    end  farm  export  subsidies  by  the  end  of  2013.  But  such 
measures are small compared with trade-distorting domestic 
farm supports: under $5 billion outright export subsidies versus 
$80 billion “amber box” subsidies worldwide, in applied terms. 
Most export subsidies were already tagged for extinction well 
before the 2013 date.
•   end tariffs and quotas, by 2008, on 97 percent of the tariff 
lines  exported  by  the  least  developed  countries  (LDCs).  But 
this commitment only modestly augments the status quo; for 
example, the United States already allows duty-free and quota-
free imports for 83 percent of LDC trade. Exempting 3 percent 
of tariff lines actually would affect a much larger share of trade 
because it would cover the least competitive domestic produc-
tion. For example, it would provide ample room to continue 
restricting trade in sugar, clothing, leather goods, and ceram-
ics—key exports of many LDCs.
•    end cotton export subsidies in 2006 and all tariffs and quotas 
restricting  LDC  cotton  exports  by  2008.  Congress  recently 
enacted some of these reforms to satisfy adverse rulings in a 
WTO dispute.
•    allow  LDCs  to  maintain  measures  inconsistent  with  the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures for at least 
seven years and possibly until 2020. Under this provision, LDCs 
can legislate “performance requirements” for years to come—
measures that often are detrimental to their own development 
but imposed to satisfy domestic political interests.
•   extend the moratorium on tariffs on e-commerce until the 
next ministerial.N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 2     Fe b r uArY   2 0 0 6
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Box 1: Doha Round deadlines (per Hong Kong declaration of December 18, 2005)











multiple deadlines for 2006
Trade officials initially had hoped that the Hong Kong minis-
terial would provide a broad outline of how far countries were 
willing to go in liberalizing agriculture, manufactures, and 
services. Agreement on these “modalities” would then enable 
Geneva negotiators to flesh out specific commitments for the 
final WTO package by the end of 2006. The United States 
tried to accelerate the Hong Kong preparations by offering, 
in early October, to substantially reduce its farm subsidies 
and import barriers, if other major trading countries did the 
same. But the European Union countered that its position on 
farm reform was sufficient and that other countries first had to 
improve offers on NAMA and services. As a result, the nego-
tiating impasse continued since most countries regard the EU 
offer as insufficient.
Long before the meeting convened, ambitious expecta-
tions  for  the  Hong  Kong  meeting  had  been  scaled  back. 
Instead of ratcheting up the negotiating stakes, the ministerial 
became a defensive effort to avoid dumbing down the WTO 
agenda or—even worse—to avoid a collapse as in the previous 
Cancún ministerial.
The Hong Kong declaration provided little guidance to 
negotiators on how to surmount obstacles that have blocked 
progress on agriculture, manufactures, and services since the 
Doha Round began in late 2001. But it did announce multi-
ple new deadlines for agreement on the “modalities”—namely, 
rules and procedures for conducting negotiations—whereby 
liberalization is finally achieved for trade in agriculture and 
industrial products and for making new offers on services (see 
box 1).
In essence, the end of April 2006 has now become the 
new target for negotiators to achieve what they sought to do 
in Hong Kong. That is when modalities for the all-important 
agricultural and industrial tariff negotiations are supposed to 
be agreed. Recall, however, that every deadline set during the 
four-year duration of the Doha Round has been missed. This 
record will likely remain unblemished in 2006.
much ado…and much left to do
Trade ministers doubtless appreciate the urgency of advanc-
ing  the  Doha  agenda  but  lack  the  political  horsepower  to 
overcome their domestic opponents, especially farmers. This 
is  particularly  true  in  the  European  Union,  where  several 
members of the European Council are seeking to constrain EU 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson. But the US Congress 
is also firing warning shots at US Trade Representative Rob 
Portman.
Progress  on  agriculture  has  been  insufficient  to  spur 
worthwhile  offers  on  manufactures  and  services,  especially 
from the handful of big emerging-market countries that will 
enjoy the most growth over the next decade—China, Brazil, 
India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Thailand. The “mini-minis-N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 2                                                                                                                                                                                   Fe b r uArY   2 0 0 6
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ating position.) Bluntly put, progress has been impeded by 
tactical considerations that mask political resistance not only 
to farm reform but also to lower industrial tariffs and greater 
access to services markets.
The main “deliverable” from Hong Kong was agreement 
to phase out all forms of farm export subsidies (including 
subsidized components of export credits, food aid, and state 
trading enterprises) by the end of 2013. This agreement was 
achievable because (1) farm export subsidies are a minor irri-
tant compared with the distortions generated by the combina-
tion of domestic farm subsidies and border restrictions, and 
(2) most US and EU export subsidies are already scheduled 
to be phased out over the next few years. Even then, the 2013 
date, tied to the EU timetable for reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), allows export subsidies to continue 
for three years longer than most countries wanted.
On  domestic  farm  support,  ministers  could  not  reach 
agreement. Levels of support bound in the Uruguay Round 
are often twice as high as current disbursements, so negotiators 
need to accept very large percentage cuts to actually change 
existing programs. The issue is further complicated by the 
need to revamp the WTO’s intricate set of accounting princi-
ples, which determine which payments are subject to cuts and 
which are not. Some payments are excluded if they fall below 
the so-called de minimis thresholds (calculated as around 5 
percent of the value of farm production). Others are classified 
as “less trade distorting” because they are accompanied by 
acreage and production limits, and these are put in a “blue 
box” with some limits. Still others are deemed “permissible,” 
because they are supposedly decoupled from price levels and 
production decisions, and these are protected in a “green box” 
with no limits. Negotiators need to clarify what programs—
and maximum subsidy amounts—can be covered by each of 
these exceptions. 
The European Union argues that it has already achieved 
a substantial reduction from its bound level of domestic 
farm support through the programmatic reforms adopted in 
2003. In fact, the EU reforms would shift many of the CAP 
developing countries than in the farm subsidies of OECD nations, Brazil’s 
interpretation would require larger cuts in applied rates for OECD farm 
subsidies and smaller applied cuts by developing countries in their industrial 
tariffs (see Inside US Trade, January 13, 2006, 3). 
The Hong Kong ministerial placed 
more emphasis on negotiating 
process than on policy reform.
terial” meeting held in Davos in late January 2006 did little to 
change the negotiating dynamics. That meeting reconfirmed 
the Hong Kong commitment to advance other issues in paral-
lel with work on agriculture but also that new offers on agri-
culture were unlikely from the major industrialized countries. 
While Brazil, India, and other developing countries may now 
step forward with new offers on manufactures and services, 
their proposals are likely to contain only minor reforms that 
fall well short of what could energize the farm talks. Despite 
the Davos rhetoric, those countries remain wary, and justifi-
ably so, that key farm reforms will be excluded or subject to 
lengthy deferment in the Doha Round negotiations.
Without substantive offers outside of agriculture, by both 
developed and developing countries, the United States, the 
European Union, and Japan will not be able to maintain—
much less augment—their offers on farm reforms. So the talks 
echo the old “Alphonse and Gaston” routine, in which each 
side waits for the other to move forward—and consequently 
neither side moves at all.
In the following subsections we explain what was not done.
Agriculture
Rightly or wrongly, agriculture has become the linchpin of the 
WTO negotiations—not because of its importance (less than 
10 percent of global merchandise trade, and growing slowly) 
but because it is the sector with the highest trade barriers 
and the area where product-specific reforms are essential to 
command the support of LDCs for the overall agreement. To 
date, the farm talks have lagged due to concerns that (1) the 
major industrial countries would not reduce their subsidies 
and/or import barriers, and (2) key developing countries, such 
as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand, would not 
lower their own import barriers. Developing countries—some 
for tactical reasons, others because they face severe pressure 
from their own farm lobbies—have hesitated to table mean-
ingful offers on industrial products and services absent hard-
and-fast commitments on agricultural reform on the part of 
OECD nations. But Mandelson insisted at Hong Kong that 
other countries should move ahead on NAMA and services 
before the European Union considered changes to its negotiat-
ing proposals.1 (USTR Portman had a more flexible negoti-
1.  An attempt was made to codify this interrelationship in the Hong Kong 
declaration. Paragraph 24 calls for a “comparably high level of ambition in 
market access for Agriculture and NAMA . . . to be achieved in a balanced 
and proportionate manner.” EU member states insisted that developing 
countries be put on notice that the European Union expects better offers on 
NAMA as reciprocity for its farm offer. But Brazil countered that the language 
requires similar cuts in farm and industrial bound tariff rates. Since there is 
often a larger gap between bound and applied rates in the industrial tariffs of N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 2     Fe b r uArY   2 0 0 6
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Concluding the talks by the 
targeted deadline of year-end 2006 
is now highly improbable.
payments into the blue or green boxes. US farm programs, 
particularly those added in the 2002 farm bill, would be more 
directly affected, in applied as well as bound terms, by lower de 
minimis thresholds and blue box limits (already agreed in the 
August 2004 framework accord). Nonetheless, in a proposal 
tabled in October 2005, US officials offered substantial cuts in 
current US programs if other countries reciprocated.
The most important pillar of the agriculture negotiations, 
market access, received the least amount of attention in Hong 
Kong. The Uruguay Round agreement set bound tariffs on 
farm products at levels well above applied rates. To drain the 
“water” from these tariffs and create new trading opportunities, 
Doha Round reforms will have to cut very deep. Furthermore, 
triple-digit  tariffs  derived  from  the  mismanaged  “tariffica-
tion” exercise of the previous round—when most quantitative 
restrictions were supposedly converted into their tariff equiva-
lents—will require additional reform through agreement on 
caps for maximum tariffs, preferably in the range of 50 to 100 
percent. To date, the European Union has offered average cuts 
in bound rates far below both the US and the G-20 propos-
als. The actual differences are difficult to calculate because the 
EU offer would permit a much larger number of exceptions 
(products not subject to the full cut or exempted outright) 
than proposed by the United States or G-20.2 Hong Kong 
made no progress in narrowing this gap, and post–Hong Kong 
comments by EU officials suggest that the EU offer will not be 
improved anytime soon.
Nonagricultural Market Access 
Ministers endorsed what had already been accepted in Geneva 
and adopted a tariff-cutting formula that requires larger reduc-
tions for high than low tariffs (a variant of the so-called Swiss 
formula).  But  they  did  not  provide  guidance  on  the  coef-
ficients to be applied in the formula, which determine how 
deep the reductions should be and the extent to which cuts 
should differ between industrial and developing countries. For 
many developing countries, such as Brazil, China, and India, 
2.  The USTR claims that the EU offer amounted to a cut of 39 percent 
in bound tariff rates, the US proposal to a cut of 66 percent, and the G-20 
proposals to a cut of 54 percent.  
big air pockets separate bound and applied tariffs, so that, for 
example, a 30 percent cut in the bound rate might make no 
difference to the applied tariff. 
Ministers also failed to clarify the permissible scope for 
exceptions to the general tariff-cutting formula. Nor did they 
provide  guidance  for  sector  negotiations,  which  would  cut 
tariffs more than the formula for selected industries. Thus, the 
framework for NAMA negotiations remains incomplete. Faced 
with all these difficulties, the ministers set a new deadline of 
April 30, 2006, for establishing the negotiating modalities.
An agreement on modalities is only one step toward a 
NAMA package. The formula will clarify the maximum and 
minimum cuts across all products, but most of the negotiating 
effort will then be spent on how the rules are bent for sensi-
tive products—which, by definition, means those protected 
by high tariffs and nontariff measures.
By far the best result would be to follow the original US 
proposal to eliminate all nonagricultural tariffs by 2015 (with 
limited  exceptions  and  longer  implementation  periods  for 
developing countries). But this outcome is extremely unlikely. 
US clothing firms strongly oppose tariff cuts, now that the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) quota system is history. 
Many developing countries are wedded to their highly protect-
ed industries (autos and consumer durables are noteworthy) 
and their trade preferences in industrial markets. A few small 
developing countries (for example, Caribbean nations) need 
tariff revenue to balance their budgets. 
 
Services 
Ministers agreed to general objectives and specific approaches 
for liberalizing trade in services (contained in annex C). The 
objectives, however, were cast as indicative guidelines, which 
WTO members should follow “to the maximum extent possi-
ble,” in crafting offers on each mode of delivery of services and 
on reducing or removing scheduled exemptions from most 
favored nation (MFN) treatment. 
Due  to  pressure  from  the  G-90,  led  by  South  Africa, 
ministers agreed that bilateral request-offer negotiations “shall 
remain the main method of negotiation” (annex C, paragraph 
6). The request-offer process is particularly tedious and has 
achieved virtually nothing since 2000. Indeed, on this basis, 
the services talks, which started before the launch of the Doha 
Round, remain stalled five years later.
As of July 2005, only 68 offers (covering 62 percent of 
WTO members) had been tabled. LDCs are not required to 
table offers if their development needs would be affected, but 
even excluding LDCs, 24 developing countries had not been 
heard from—including South Africa, Venezuela, Nigeria, and N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 2                                                                                                                                                                                   Fe b r uArY   2 0 0 6
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In agriculture, the main “deliverable” 
from Hong Kong was agreement 
to phase out all forms of farm 
export subsidies by end 2013.
Ecuador. Moreover, the small number of offers tabled masks 
even smaller projected reforms—in other words, the “qual-
ity” of the offers, especially on the provision of services via 
commercial establishment (mode 3) and labor services (mode 
4) is extremely low. Often the offers merely commit to bind 
existing  practices  and  thus  do  not  open  new  commercial 
opportunities  (the  old  bound  versus  applied  issue).  Some 
offers even propose setting obligations at levels more restric-
tive than current practice!
Ministers agreed that groups of countries could pursue 
“plurilateral” negotiations, whose results “shall be extended on 
an MFN basis”—that is, to all WTO members, even coun-
tries that make no concession whatsoever. This process could 
produce  sector  pacts;  the  ministerial  declaration  makes  no 
mention of specific sectors and does not address the issue of 
critical mass. But it does reaffirm all of the special and differ-
ential provisions in prior declarations that significantly dilute 
the liberalization that developing countries must undertake.
As a ballpark estimate, we assume that at least 15 coun-
tries need to agree on economically meaningful offers in 15 
sectors, mainly involving telecommunications and financial 
services, professional services (legal, health, engineering, 
computer, and education), energy services, and transport and 
distribution services. According to annex C of the Hong Kong 
declaration, plurilateral requests should be made by the end of 
February and offers tabled by the end of July 2006. Since many 
countries will not develop offers until they see what comes out 
of the agriculture and NAMA work on modalities (due by the 
end of April 2006), it seems unlikely that a broad 15 by 15 
matrix of plurilateral request/offers can be put together by the 
July target, much less a final package negotiated by the end of 
October 2006 as mandated in paragraph 11 of annex C.
For a deal on services to come together, the ad hoc “core 
group on services” must engage in intensive talks. The United 
States and India co-chair the core group; other members are 
Brazil, China, the European Union, Mexico, Australia, South 
Korea,  Malaysia,  Singapore,  Japan,  Argentina,  Chile,  and 
Canada. If South Africa, Egypt, and Switzerland join the party, 
perhaps a critical mass will exist for some key sectors. But this 
group comprises countries with very different priorities, both 
by sector and mode of delivery.
Industrial countries seek reforms in infrastructure services 
where their firms are competitive (e.g., banking, insurance, 
telecom, and air transport), while developing countries want 
new  opportunities  to  provide  labor-oriented  services  (e.g., 
health care, construction, and basic information technology 
services). Satisfying both camps requires the elimination of 
nationalistic rules on establishment and governance and the 
reform of regulation that fosters incumbent suppliers. Changes 
are doubly contentious when the existing rules reflect national 
security and cultural objectives.
Commitments on labor services (mode 4) pose a particu-
lar challenge. Congress has warned the USTR not to make 
offers that would alter US immigration policy. Moreover, the 
electronic delivery of services to OECD markets may prove 
far more important to most developing countries than new 
migration opportunities. However, to reach an overall agree-
ment on services in the Doha Round, specific and narrowly 
focused obligations may need to be undertaken on mode 4. As 
one way around the impasse, the USTR might discuss a list 
of activities for which the cross-border provision of temporary 
labor services, controlled both as to number and length of 
employment, would be accepted by Congress.
Rules 
While the negotiation on rules covers a number of subjects, 
the spotlight is focused on antidumping and countervailing 
duties. Disciplines on regional trading arrangements and fish 
subsidies also attract some notice. In Hong Kong, all these 
issues  were  relegated  to  a  single  sentence  in  the  ministe-
rial  declaration,  which  merely  echoed  previous  negotiating 
mandates. However, ministers attending the Davos meeting 
went further and essentially put the drafting of new text on 
trade rules on a similar timetable as advances in talks on farm 
and industrial products.
As the negotiations move closer to a conclusion, the anti-
dumping issue could become more contentious, for two related 
reasons. Some countries want to curtail the perceived abuse of 
antidumping practices; others, as a matter of tactics, conclude 
that US reluctance to move on antidumping will allow them 
to take their own sensitive issues off the table. Some countries 
want it both ways: curtail the use of antidumping measures by 
industrial countries but allow developing countries unfettered 
use of this safeguard tool. Developing countries, including 
China, now rank among the most active users of antidumping 
measures and insist on maintaining their policy flexibility. N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 2     Fe b r uArY   2 0 0 6
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Our bet is on the short extension 
of trade promotion authority, 
say to December 2007.
Some  countries  want  the  WTO  rules  clarified  and 
augmented with regard to issues dealt with in recent WTO 
dispute panel rulings.3 US and EU decisions have been found 
wanting by the WTO Appellate Body, and some countries 
seek to codify the case holdings in WTO obligations. Key 
members of Congress have told US negotiators to reject such 
demands.4
What sayeth the crystal Ball?
Predicting  the  outcome  of  a  massive  trade  negotiation  is 
subject to even more than the usual hazards of forecasting 
endeavors. Nevertheless, national positions have sufficiently 
hardened, and the time remaining is sufficiently short, that we 
can hazard a few guesses. We cast our speculation in the form 
of answers to five hypothetical questions that presidents and 
prime ministers might pose to their trade officials.
Can the Doha Round Be Concluded in 2006? 
The US Trade Act of 2002, which includes trade promotion 
authority (TPA), requires the president to notify the Congress 
by December 2006 if he intends to offer amendments to the 
trade  remedy  laws  (antidumping,  countervailing  duty,  and 
escape clause legislation), and by April 2007 if he intends to 
sign  an  agreement.  Any  agreement  so  notified,  and  signed 
before June 30, 2007, can then take advantage of the crucial 
“fast track” features of the TPA law: a congressional vote up or 
down within 90 days, with no amendments. 
Despite these US deadlines, reinforced by the multiple 
deadlines set forth in the Hong Kong declaration, the pros-
pects for concluding by December 2006, or indeed by April 
2007, are near zero. The negotiating gaps are just too great, and 
the sense of crisis is too far removed, to conclude the round on 
schedule. Indeed, the history of the Doha Round, from its late 
inauguration (in 2001, almost seven years after the Uruguay 
3. One practice that the WTO Appellate Body has rejected is “zeroing”—
namely the exclusion of imports that have a negative dumping margin from 
the calculation of the average positive dumping margin for the product. 
Another rejected practice is the “cumulation” of imports from suppliers that 
are not targeted with dumping duties with imports from suppliers that are 
targeted in determining injury. 
4. In principle, the judicial rule of stare decisis does not apply to WTO 
Appellate Body decisions. Some Congressmen evidently hope that future 
WTO Appellate judges will take a different view on the antidumping issues 
lost by the United States. In practice, as scholars have shown, WTO Appellate 
Body decisions do follow the rule of stare decisis, so congressional hopes are 
unlikely to be answered.
Round was concluded), right through the Cancún and Hong 
Kong ministerials, is a history of missed deadlines. 
Hong Kong closed the door on prospects for complet-
ing a big package of agreements by the end of 2006, or even 
early 2007, in time to allow the United States to implement 
the results under current TPA. To be sure, trade and agricul-
ture ministers are hard at work trying to disprove our somber 
assessment. Such efforts are critical to the success of the Doha 
Round—whether it comes in 2006 or later. As a practical 
matter, WTO negotiators must operate under the assumption 
that the Doha Round can be successfully concluded before 
the expiration of US TPA. There is no assurance that TPA 
would be extended—given how sharply divided Congress is 
on trade issues—and there is much evidence that extending 
the horizon of the talks could undermine negotiating momen-
tum. So ministers will engage in frenetic negotiations to craft 
a substantive package of trade reforms in all areas of the WTO 
agenda. Completing such a package by year-end would be an 
enormous feat and is highly unlikely. But making progress to 
that end in 2006 is essential—because without such progress, 
it will be hard for US officials to justify an extension of TPA.
That said, the Doha Round can follow three paths.
The first scenario is outright failure. Under this scenario, 
countries allow the talks to drift aimlessly because of a lack 
of consensus. Diplomats go through the motions in Geneva 
for years to come—an exercise for which they are well expe-
rienced. As in the aftermath of the Cancún fiasco, regional 
initiatives proliferate—particularly in East Asia—as an alter-
native to WTO liberalization. At the same time, failure feeds 
strong demands for new protectionism—especially against the 
“flood” of low-wage exports from China and India.
The second scenario is that countries agree on a minimalist 
deal that omits reform of key trade restrictions. Some observ-
ers believe that even a small deal would keep the multilateral 
process alive, and that sector negotiations (say, on services) 
could continue as part of another “built-in” negotiating agen-
da. But a small package would leave both rich and poor coun-
tries deeply dissatisfied. It, too, would provoke a new wave of 
regional trading arrangements and targeted protectionism.
Why  would  developing  countries  agree  to  postpone  a 
maximum multilateral accord until the next round, a decade 
or more in the future—especially when there is no guarantee N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 2                                                                                                                                                                                   Fe b r uArY   2 0 0 6
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that there will be another round? And why would OECD 
countries agree to a result that offers no political or economic 
gain after all the effort? The strongest answer to both ques-
tions—weak though it is—is that today’s trade ministers and 
their political leaders do not want to leave office with “failure” 
written on their resumes. 
The third scenario is full-bore negotiations that extend 
through 2007, possibly longer. In essence, countries are already 
pursuing this option. Most countries can easily agree to extend 
the talks. For the United States, however, extending the round 
requires decisions by the Congress on whether to reauthorize 
TPA (and, if so, for how long, and whether for WTO talks 
only or both the WTO and free trade agreements [FTAs]) and 
whether to extend or rewrite the US farm bill, which expires 
at the end of the 2007 crop year. 
White House officials and business lobbyists have been 
scarred  by  the  fractious  ratification  vote  on  the  Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and fear that reau-
thorization of TPA would revisit the battle of summer 2005. 
The slim protrade majority in the House of Representatives 
could fall victim to the November 2006 mid-term elections. 
To legitimize the request for an extension of TPA, the Bush 
administration will have to demonstrate that large benefits are 
in the offing from both the Doha Round and big new FTAs 
under negotiation. To increase the chances of TPA renewal, 
the Doha Round will have to make significant progress in 
2006, particularly in the areas of US export interest: agricul-
ture, services, and NAMA. 
Deliberations on a new farm bill may be just as conten-
tious. The administration went out on a limb in proposing 
major reforms in farm subsidies. While supported by major 
farm groups (because the US offer was conditioned on reciproc-
ity from US trading partners), some key members of Congress 
voiced concern. If the Doha Round is extended, Congress will 
have to decide whether to simply extend the 2002 farm bill   
(perhaps for the same period as the TPA extension) and await 
the results of the trade negotiations or to rewrite the farm bill 
so as to constrain the US negotiating position in the talks. 
Either way, the subsidy gravy train to US farmers will add red 
ink to the federal budget. 
The  serious  question  is  whether  a  short  extension  of 
TPA, say to December 2007, will become the fall-back posi-
tion, or whether the G-8 and G-20 will decide to “give the 
round a rest,” let TPA lapse, and resume negotiations after 
the US presidential election in 2008. Our bet is on the short 
extension: A two-year “rest” would be widely interpreted as a 
permanent and fatal interment for the Doha Round.
We believe the Doha Round needs a political “jolt” if it 
is to follow the third scenario and produce a notable result. 
Trade ministers do not have the political authority to approve 
reforms in sensitive areas needed to produce a comprehensive 
package of accords acceptable to all WTO member countries. 
Decisions by heads of state, perhaps encompassing issues that 
transcend the trade agenda, probably will be needed to provide 
each leader political ammunition to counter domestic critics.
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva vetted this 
idea  prematurely  before  the  Hong  Kong  ministerial.  The 
timing was wrong, but the idea has merit. A “trade summit” 
involving countries whose policy reforms are crucial to the 
success of the WTO venture is needed, preferably before the 
G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia. The reason for another 
head-of-state meeting is that certain countries that are key to 
the Doha Round—Brazil, China, and India—are not members 
of the G-8, while Russia (a G-8 member) plays virtually 
no role in Doha talks. Such a meeting should seek to break 
the negotiating deadlock by raising the prospect of a “grand 
bargain”; to that end, the leaders should agree to extend the 
talks for a short period to accommodate their higher ambition. 
How Do Negotiations Look from the Perspective 
of Key Players? 
First  consider  key  interest  groups.  For  most  CEOs  of  the 
Global 1000, the WTO talks are either a yawn or an irritation. 
The prospective market opening in the big emerging markets 
(China, India, Brazil, Russia, etc.) is much too modest for 
CEOs to throw their weight against their formidable domestic 
opponents. For some of the Global 1000—not only textiles, 
clothing, and footwear but also pharmaceuticals, entertain-
ment, steel, and autos—the WTO talks are viewed more as a 
threat than an opportunity.5 Meanwhile, the domestic
opponents of liberalization—farm and textile lobbies in the 
United States, Europe, and Japan, coddled banks and utili-
ties as well as farmers and manufacturers in most developing 
countries, and a wide range of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs)—are better organized than the proponents of a big 
bargain. Finally, without a Cold War, global trade talks don’t 
dovetail  with  diplomatic  imperatives.  Hence  most  foreign 
ministers, presidents, and prime ministers give trade talks a 
5.  However, there is strong corporate support for several big-ticket FTAs (e.g., 
Korea, Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia) that could reinforce already substantial 
US trade and investment interests.
Of all major countries, China has
the most to lose from the collapse
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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has capped the more outra-
geous tariffs, but in multilateral talks, India’s position remains 
faithful to an earlier age. Brazil is right alongside India, except 
that Brazil has a much wider list of offensive interests. For 
both Brazil and India, securing permanent seats on the Secu-
rity Council is far more important than the Doha Round.
What Events Are Likely to Drive Negotiators
in 2006? 
Three things are likely: (1) Farm legislators and lobbies in the 
United States and Europe will try to preempt trade ministers 
by extending subsidy commitments and making them hard-
and-fast guarantees, whatever comes out of the Doha Round. 
These efforts should, at the least, prompt more energetic trade 
negotiations. (2) A trade-weighted slide in the dollar (we are 
predicting 10 to 15 percent by December 2006) will modestly 
allay opposition to greater market access for manufactures and 
agriculture within the United States but will not make much 
difference to lobbies for the most sensitive products—textiles 
and clothing, sugar, and other specialty agriculture. However, 
if the dollar adjustment falls disproportionately on the euro 
because of Chinese and Japanese intervention, then the result 
could be a surge in European protectionism that could doom 
the  round.  (3)  The  absence  of  an  economic,  financial,  or 
diplomatic crisis—as the world economy coasts along at 3 to 
4 percent growth, as mergers and acquisitions activity thrives, 
and as the Iraq war winds down—coupled with pending elec-
tions in the United States, Europe, and Brazil will deprive the 
Doha Round of a sense of urgency. 
What Are the Wildcards? 
Delay means additional risk that trade talks get side-swiped by 
other developments. Three wildcards—possible but unlikely 
events—deserve mention: (1) A terrorist attack that involves 
international  shipping  or  air  travel,  or  pandemic  flu  that 
hits North America and Europe, would badly erode public 
support for trade negotiations. Moreover, new security and 
health measures would, for a considerable period, offset any 
negotiated liberalization. (2) A further spike in oil prices, say 
to $90/bbl or higher (perhaps driven by a face-off with Iran 
over nuclear weapons), is likely to push the world economy 
into recession and undermine trade negotiations. (3) Rampant 
China bashing in both the United States and Europe could 
provoke  tit-for-tat  trade  retaliation,  which  in  turn  would 
disrupt the Doha Round. 
second-tier ranking among their priorities. Attitudes at the 
top will need to change, dramatically, before President Lula da 
Silva’s “trade summit” becomes a reality. 
Now consider key nations. In the European Union, the 
Council of Ministers is trying to craft language that would 
rein in EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson. Reform-weary 
members like France and Italy have been able to blunt reform-
ist proposals by the United Kingdom and Sweden. EU firms 
seek  serious  services  liberalization  and  much  lower  tariffs 
on manufactured goods in emerging markets, but they have 
nearly given up hope. Both goals seem remote. Japan is right 
alongside the EU defensive agenda.
The United States is playing a defensive/offensive hand. 
Farm lobbies will fiercely resist cuts in applied subsidy levels 
and  tariff/quota  barriers  until  they  see  equivalent  applied 
liberalization in Europe, Japan, Korea, and elsewhere. Phar-
maceuticals, entertainment, and software firms are spending 
most of their effort to avert backsliding on the Agreement 
on Trade-Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights 
(TRIPS). High-tech manufacturers want zero-for-zero tariffs, 
and service firms want the right of establishment and national 
treatment in key sectors. The main difference between US and 
EU firms with offensive goals is that US firms are somewhat 
more optimistic that meaningful results can be achieved.
For the moment, China wants to be everyone’s friend 
in the WTO—the OECD, the G-20, etc. At the same time, 
China argues that it paid when it joined the WTO back in 
2001, so it doesn’t need to make additional concessions. Look-
ing at China’s growing trade surplus and mountain of foreign 
exchange, no one outside Beijing is persuaded. China’s posi-
tion should change when the round approaches its climax, for 
two reasons. The strategic reason is that, of all major countries, 
China has the most to lose from the collapse of the WTO 
system. China’s fast domestic growth rate depends on keep-
ing its export engine running, which in turn requires an open 
world trading system. The mercantilistic reason is that China’s 
trade barriers are already low compared with its peers (e.g., 
India and Brazil), so large percentage cuts in base tariff rates 
will  translate  into  small  changes  in  China’s  applied  tariffs. 
Besides, contributing more than most developing countries 
would allow China to respond positively to protectionist pres-
sures in Europe and the United States and would give China 
a political advantage in its relations with other developing 
countries. 
One of India’s priorities is to nourish its golden goose: 
offshore insourcing. Another Indian priority is to protect its 
generic  pharmaceutical  firms  and  a  long  list  of  monopoly 
service providers. All this translates into blatant mercantilism. N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 2                                                                                                                                                                                   Fe b r uArY   2 0 0 6
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What Happens if the Doha Round Slides 
to a Shallow Conclusion Late in 2007? 
Here is what one of us (Hufbauer) said on October 30, 2003, 
in the Foote Lecture, delivered at the University of Alberta:
Following the failure at Cancún, it seems all but certain 
that Doha negotiations will stretch into 2007. . . .The high 
likelihood that the Doha Round does not achieve [a signifi-
cant outcome] does not mean that trade ministers will at 
some point declare a failure and go home. Career stakes in 
declaring a “success,” no matter how shallow, are too great!
 But a shallow outcome will essentially mark the end 
of the WTO’s 50-year run as the lead engine of commer-
cial  liberalization.  Instead,  liberalization  will  increasingly 
become the province of FTAs. The European Union and the 
United States will continue to offer agreements to small and 
mid-sized  countries  that  are  economically  and  politically 
attractive….
  Big questions revolve around the ways Japan, China, 
India, and Russia choose to play the FTA game. Will there 
be a China-Japan-Korea FTA? Will each Asian power form 
its own network? Will Russia negotiate a special arrange-
ment with the European Union? What will be the foreign 
policy consequences of competing hubs? The fact that these 
questions are both big and troublesome does not, in my 
view, alter the forecast that regional and bilateral FTAs will 
take the lead on trade and investment liberalization at least 
for the next decade.
Based  on  the  Hong  Kong  ministerial  and  the  forces 
outlined in this policy brief, the forecast that bilateral and 
regional FTAs will become the engine of liberalization after 
the Doha Round still seems reasonable.
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